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Abstract 
Fiscal and financial management in South Asian cities typically face constraints in capacity 
and utilization of resources. This paper attempts a systematic analysis of three corporations 
in the region: the Indian city of Kolkata (Kolkata Municipal Corporation, KMC) and the 
city corporations in Bangladesh’s capital city, Dhaka (Dhaka North City Corporation, 
DNCC, and Dhaka South City Corporation, DSCC). Based on the incomes and 
expenditures of these corporations, this paper attempts for the first time a comparison in 
the status of finances and service delivery in cities of two South Asian Countries. The main 
findings suggest that the revenue receipts of KMC is significantly higher than that of either 
DNCC or DSCC or even both the bodies combined. This is true for own revenue as well 
as for grants from the upper tiers. Both DNCC and DSCC have expenses, which are way 
below the low level of existing earnings. These expenses are less when compared with 
international expenditure norms also. For KMC the revenue is not sufficient to cover the 
expenditures. For DNCC and DSCC, levels of expenditures on provision of urban services 
are abysmally low, which is also reflected in the status of service delivery in these cities. 
Property tax accounts for the lion’s share of the tax revenue in both Kolkata and Dhaka. 
For Dhaka, non-tax revenues obtained from fees, fines, rates, etc. have a higher share in 
own revenue, while Kolkata has higher shares of taxes. Interestingly, despite the low 
revenue generation capacity of the DNCC and DSCC, this is what comprises the bulk of 
total revenue. Grants received from the upper tiers are very low in DNCC and DSCC 
compared to the fact that close to half of KMC’s total revenue comes from grants. We also 
estimated the GCP for Dhaka and Kolkata and did some simulation exercises for estimating 
the revenue capacities. Based on these exercises, we suggest that KMC should generate up 
to 4 percent of their GCP as revenues for the corporation. For Dhaka, 1 percent of GCP as 
revenues in both DNCC and DSCC are estimated as their potentials. 
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With a growing rate of population, migration and the burgeoning demand for industrialization, 
there has been a great pressure on urban infrastructure in the cities of South Asia. India and 
Bangladesh are no exceptions. The process of decentralization took a strong hold in India during 
the 74th Amendment Act in 1992, which devolved certain functions and finances to the urban 
local governments.1 With a federal system of government, India has fairly independent states 
which exert substantial control over the local rural and urban bodies, although the devolution 
varies across the states. Bangladesh, on the other hand, has a unitary democratic form of 
government with largely deconcentrated rather than devolved local bodies. Since the 1972 
constitutional provision of elected local government (Articles 59 and 60) which requires the 
parliament to determine specific responsibilities for the local bodies, local government has had a 
checkered history in Bangladesh. Despite the efforts towards decentralization in both Dhaka and 
Kolkata, the status of basic services like roads, sewerage, sanitation and street lighting continues 
to remain inadequate.  
In this paper, we analyze the performance of the two urban local bodies (ULB) in Dhaka- Dhaka 
North City Corporation (DNCC) and Dhaka South City Corporation (DSCC) and one urban local 
body in India- Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC). The paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 sets the context by discussing some socio-economic indicators in all the three 
corporations. Section 3 gives a broad idea about the finances in the three ULBs. An assessment 
of fiscal health of each city corporation is attempted in Section 4. Section 5 suggests some 
simple simulations to assess the maximum revenue potentials of the city governments. A 
                                               





comparative analysis of the status of service delivery is offered in section 6. Section 7 concludes 
the discussions.  
2. Socio-Economic Indicators  
Population dynamics in Bangladesh is now primarily an urban phenomenon. Approximately 37 
percent of the country’s 161.8 million people live in the urban areas. The urbanization has been 
such that Dhaka, the capital city, has also emerged as the primate city. It houses an estimated 
11.1 million people making it home to more than 35 percent of the urban population and more 
than 10 percent of the total population of Bangladesh. The population density in the city exceeds 
35,000 people per square kilometer. We collected information on the population figures for the 
two city corporation areas for 2017-18, which is shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Demographics in DNCC and DSCC and KMC* 
ULB Population Area (square km) Population Density (persons/km2) 
DNCC 4,832,346 197 24,530 
DSCC 3,883,423 109.3 35,546 
KMC 4,496,694 207 21,739 
Source: Authors’ computation based on data collected from DNCC and DSCC; Census of India (2011)  
Note: Data for DNCC and DSCC pertain to 2017-18, while for KMC data is for 2011. 
 
A look at few of the other socio-economic characteristics of Dhaka city reveal a literacy rate of 
74.6 percent in 2011 (Table 2). When we consider the urban parts of Dhaka Division and overall 
Dhaka district (Dhaka zila) the figures are lower.2 Literacy rate is an indicator of the extent of 
awareness and the demands that people place on service delivery. Literacy rate can also throw 
light on the level of development and hence the revenue raising capacity of the city. Participation 
of people in economic activities is an important indicator that can inform about the vibrancy of 
the city, the demand for service delivery and the quantum of revenue that can be generated from 
                                               




the incomes of the people in the city. We find that the crude activity rate3 in Dhaka district is 
only 44.34 percent. With more than half the population outside the sphere of economic activity 
and yet demanding the services in the area, there exists a tremendous pressure on the city 
corporations for providing the services to this proportion of the population vis-à-vis revenue 
generated from the usage of those services by this proportion of population. The population 
density figures that we have already observed lend further credence to the pressure that is put on 
the service delivery in both DNCC and DSCC. It may be noted that although the DNCC has 
approximately one million people more than the DSCC, the pressure on services is higher in the 
latter, because the population density in DNCC is lower by almost 11,000 people per square 
kilometer compared to DSCC. Although figures on housing characteristics are not available 
separately for the city corporation areas, the number of people residing in pucca houses for 
Dhaka district (urban) is approximately 54 percent. 
Table 2. Socio-Economic Indicators in Dhaka 
Indicators Percentage 
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka division) 64.3 
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka district) 71.1 
Literacy (7+) (Dhaka City Corporation) 74.6 
Crude Activity Rate (Dhaka district) 44.34 
Source: BBS (2012, 2014a, 2014b) 
 
The KMC is one of the largest ULBs in India, which has a high population density of 21,739 per 
square km (Table 1). It is spread over an area of 207 square km as per the Census of India, 2011, 
which has increased from 186 square km in 2001. There has been a fall in the population from 
4,580,546 in 2001 to 4,496,694 in 2011. However, despite the fall, the population density in 
KMC is as high as 21,739 persons per square kilometer (Census of India, 2011). The literacy rate 
                                               
3 The crude activity rate is defined as the ratio of economically active population in the age group 10 years and over 




stands at 80 percent. Another indicator of development is given by the percentage of people 
living in the permanent houses,4 which stands at 93 percent.  
A preliminary comparison of the two cities reveal that the KMC has a lower population density 
and a higher literacy rate than the Dhaka city corporations. Unfortunately, other indicators 
available cannot be directly compared. However, it can be deduced that KMC would have a 
lesser burden on existing level of services compared to DNCC and DSCC. That the demand and 
revenue generation might not be enough in Dhaka cities can also be concluded by the fact that 
only approximately 44 percent of their population are economically active. Within Dhaka, we 
see that DNCC is better placed than DSCC due to lesser population density and hence lower 
pressure on the existing services. The effect of these on service delivery is seen later in the paper. 
3. Finances of the Corporations: Revenues and Expenditures 
We took the revenue receipts and revenue expenditure data for all the cities in 2011-12 prices 
and converted the currencies of each country into US dollars to make the comparison easier 
between KMC and the two Dhaka city corporations by multiplying the values for each year by 
the respective exchange rate for each country.5 
When we compare the finances of DNCC and DSCC with KMC, we find a stark difference. 
(Table 3). Property tax,6 which is the more important source of revenue for any local body, is 
higher in KMC by over 450 percent as compared to DNCC as well as DSCC. In absolute terms, 
the per capita property tax is higher in KMC by US$ 17.6 for DNCC and US$ 17.8 in DSCC. 
                                               
4 Permanent houses refer to those houses whose walls & roofs are made of pucca materials, i.e., where burnt bricks, 
G.I. sheets or other metal sheets, stone, cement, concrete is used for wall and tiles, slate, shingle, corrugated iron, 
zinc or other metal sheets, asbestos sheets, bricks, lime and stone and RBC/RCC are used for roof. 
5 Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/INR-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2020.html 




The predominance of property in total tax revenue yields the same pattern gets in tax revenue as 
well. The non-tax revenue is also higher in KMC compared to both DNCC and DSCC by a 
margin of over 200 percent. Per capita grants are in KMC amount to US$75.5 while the 
corresponding figures for DNCC and DSCC are a paltry US$0.6 and US$ 1.5 respectively. It 
appears that the both DNCC and DSCC do not get enough support from the upper tiers of the 
government (See Table A1, Appendix for year wise data on finances in DNCC, DSCC and 
KMC). It is in the fitness of things to mention here that we have not considered receipts from 
project funds in case of DNCC and DSCC.7 This is because projects have separate time-bound 
expenditure requirement that would give us a misleading picture of city corporation finances, if 
included with the rest of the income sources. However, from the budget documents, we 
calculated the grants from the upper tiers of the government because of projects and these varied 
from less than 15 percent of the total income exclusive of project funds to more than 90 percent 
of the same.  
In terms of per capita revenue expenditure, we see a similar pattern; the gap between KMC and 
DNCC stands at US$71.9 and between KMC and DSCC stands at US$69.8. Between 2012-13 
and 2018-19, the per capita revenue expenditure in both the city corporations in Dhaka did not 
go beyond a high of US$ 6.5, while for KMC it had reached US$ 112. With a substantially lower 
level of expenditure by both DNCC and DSCC, we can expect their service delivery to be falling 
behind KMC. This will be elaborated in a later section. 
  
                                               




Table 3. Summary statistics of per capita revenue and expenditure (in US dollars) 
                               Local body 
Finances  
(in US $) 
KMC 
Geometric Mean  
(Max, Min) 
DNCC 
Geometric Mean  
(Max, Min) 
DSCC 
Geometric Mean  
(Max, Min) 
Property Tax  21.5 (31.8, 14.5) 3.9 (4.5, 2.9) 3.7 (4.9, 2.5) 
Tax Revenue  22.3 (32.5, 15.3) 4 (4.7, 3) 3.8 (5, 2.6) 
Non Tax Revenue  14.2 (20.5, 1) 4.3 (4.9, 3.4) 4.7 (5.7, 3.9) 
Own Revenue  36.6 (49.8, 23.5) 8.3 (9.4, 6.4) 8.5 (9.8, 6.8) 
Grants  34.2 (40.3, 28.2) 0.6 (2.2, 0.3) 1.5 (5.9, 0.7) 
Total Revenue Receipts  72.1 (90.4, 51.7) 9.5 (11.4, 7.1) 10.8 (14.6, 7.6) 
Total Revenue Expenditure  75.5 (112, 64) 3.6 (4.1, 2.8) 5.7 (6.5, 5) 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Note: The average value is taken over the year 2010-11 to 2017-18 for KMC (due to availability of average yearly 
exchange rate from the year 2010 onwards). The period under consideration for both DNCC and DSCC is 2012-13 
to 2018-19. 
Let us look in more detail at the different components of revenue receipts in all the three ULBs. 
Table 4 gives us the shares of different components of revenue in own revenue and/or in total 
revenue receipts. Property tax comprises 97 percent of the tax revenue in all the three ULBs. 
However, its share is higher in the own revenue in KMC (57 percent) as compared to DNCC 
(46.8 percent) and DSCC (43 percent). Property tax also forms a lower share of total revenue 
receipts in KMC as compared to both DNCC and DSCC. We see that KMC draws most of its 
own revenues through tax income (61 percent) while for DNCC and DSCC this share is less than 
50 percent. For the latter, the non-tax revenue forms a greater proportion in their own revenues. 
With property tax rates remaining stagnant since the late 1980s in the face of failed attempts to 
revise the rates, this has been an under-explored option for the Dhaka city corporations. Grants 
as a proportion of total revenue can give us some idea about the extent of decentralization and 
self-reliance. In KMC, 44 percent of the total revenue is obtained from grants. The 
corresponding share is much lower for DNCC at 7.5 percent and for DSCC at 13.8 percent. We 
cannot really tout this as a self-reliance of Dhaka cities rather it is a reflection of poor 
decentralization of finances from the upper tiers of government. The next section brings revenue 




Table 4. Share of Different Revenue Components in Own Revenue and Total Revenue (%) 
(average over years) 


























































































Source: Authors’ computation 
4. An Assessment of Fiscal Health  
We consider three important determinants of fiscal health, viz. revenue-expenditure gap, own 
revenue to GCP ratio and revenue capacity. A comparison of the revenue and expenditure gap 
across the cities reveal that the per capita revenue expenditure exceeds per capita own revenue 
receipts by US$ 43.4 on an average in KMC, whereas the own revenues are sufficient enough to 
cover revenue expenditure in both DNCC and DSCC (Table 5). When we compare the revenue 
expenditure per capita to the total revenue receipts per capita, we see that again the total 
revenues fall short of the revenue expenditure by US$ 7.8 in KMC. But in DNCC and DSCC the 
per capita revenue receipts exceed the per capita total revenue expenditure. One might call it a 




services provided by the city corporations to comment further on it (It could be because the 
ULBs are incurring insufficient expenditure on the services) 
The own revenue to GCP ratio tells us about the share of the city product generated as own 
revenue by the cities. Since we do not have data on GCP for each city/corporation, we estimate 
the GCP by using the Gross District Domestic Product for KMC and the data available for the 
Dhaka Urban Cluster for DNCC and DSCC. The methodologies differ slightly between India and 
Bangladesh due to availability of data at different dis-aggregation levels. 














































Source: Authors’ computations 
Method of Estimation of Gross City Product for KMC:  
For KMC, we took the non-agricultural component of Gross District Domestic Product (GDDP) 
as a proxy for GCP. We estimate the non-agricultural component of the GDDP by multiplying 
the share of urban population by the GDDP for each year. We estimate the own revenue to GCP 
ratio for the period 2007-08 through 2012-13.8 The geometric mean for 2007-08 to 2012-13 was 
1.6 percent.  
                                               




Method of Estimation of Gross City Product for Dhaka 
In the absence of any estimate of GCP in Dhaka, we used the contribution done by the Dhaka 
Urban Cluster in the GDP to estimate the GCP of Dhaka. The contribution of Dhaka Urban 
Cluster in the national GDP is 36 percent (Jha, Raghuram and Awasthi, 2019). With GDP of 
Bangladesh in current prices for 2017-18 standing at BDT 22,38,498 crores, the contribution of 
Dhaka Urban Cluster works out to be BDT 8,05,859 crores. The population for Dhaka Urban 
Cluster9 is 18.9 million (Jha, Raghuram and Awasthi, 2019). Thus the per capita income in the 
Dhaka Urban Cluster is BDT 4,26,381. Taking this as a benchmark, we construct a scenario, 
where we estimate GCP for both the corporations. We then do a simulation for estimating the 
revenue capacity. 
We assume that the per capita income for Dhaka Urban Cluster is the same in both the city 
corporations. Thus, we take per capita GCP to be BDT 4,26,381 in DNCC as well as in DSCC. 
Multiplying by the respective populations of DNCC and DSCC, we get the total estimated GCP 
generated in each city corporation (Table 6). Using the own revenue generated in the year 2017-
18 in DNCC and DSCC at market prices, we find the own revenue to GCP ratio at 0.3 percent in 
DNCC and 0.28 percent in DSCC.  
For KMC, we took the non-agricultural component of Gross District Domestic Product (GDDP) 
as a proxy for GCP. We take the per capita non- agricultural component of GDDP of Kolkata 
district,10 in which KMC is located, as a proxy of per capita GCP in KMC. Multiplying this per 
capita income by the population of KMC, we generate the estimate of GCP in KMC. We 
                                               
9 Map 1 in the Appendix gives an idea about the urban cluster of Dhaka in Bangladesh 




estimate the own revenue to GCP ratio for the period 2007-08 through 2012-13.11 The geometric 
mean was 1.6 percent.  
Table 6. Estimates of GCP and own revenue to GCP ratios 
Variables   Dhaka 
Contribution of Dhaka Urban Cluster in GDP of Bangladesh  36% 
GDP of Bangladesh for the year 2017-18 in current prices in BDT 2238498,00,00,000 
GCP (36% of GDP for 2017-18 in current prices) in BDT 805859,28,00,000 
Total Population in Dhaka Urban Cluster 1,89,00,000 
Per Capita GCP for Dhaka Urban Cluster 4,26,381 
Assumption: Per capita GCP is the same in DNCC and DSCC DNCC DSCC 
Per capita GCP 4,26,381 4,26,381 
Population in 2017-18 48,35,180 35,63,376 
Estimated Gross City Product in BDT 2061,62,69,15,157 1519,35,42,31,896 
Own Revenue for the year 2017-18 in current prices 612,07,36,768 422,99,41,881 
Own Revenue to GCP ratio (%) 0.30 0.28 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Table 7 gives own revenue to GCP ratio of all the three city corporations. For Dhaka, we take the 
most optimistic scenario of 0.30 for DNCC and 0.28 for DSCC and compare this with KMC for 
which the actual own revenue to GCP ratio is 1.6 percent. Thus, KMC performs better than the 
Dhaka city corporations in this regard as well. In the next section we estimate the revenue 
capacity by estimating the maximum own revenue that each city is able to generate. 
Table 7. Own revenue to GCP ratio (percent) 
 KMC DNCC DSCC 
Own Revenue-GCP Ratio 1.6 0.30 0.28 
Source: Authors’ computation 
Note: We have taken the geometric mean for KMC (from 2007-08 through 2012-13). For Dhaka cities, the value 
pertains to 2017-18, for which it was feasible to estimate GCP and hence the ratio. 
 
                                               




5. Revenue Capacity Estimations 
The most optimistic scenario is estimated for all three corporations. We do some simulations to 
see how much can the own revenue be raised in each city. In case of KMC, we find the actual 
own revenue to GCP ratio to be 1.6 percent. With this level of own revenue receipts, the KMC 
was not able to meet its revenue expenditure. We raise the ratio of own revenue to GCP to 2 
percent and estimated the own revenue receipts at this ratio. At this level of own revenue also, 
the local body was not able to meet the revenue expenditure. We do a second simulation where 
we estimate the own revenue to GCP ratio such that own revenues can cover the revenue 
expenditure. We took the average revenue expenditure to GCP ratio of 3.2 percent as the 
benchmark. We find that KMC was able to meet its revenue expenditure in only two of the years 
under consideration and in the remaining years it could not meet the revenue expenditure with 
the estimated own revenue. In the third simulation we raised own revenue to GCP ratio to 4 
percent and estimated the own revenue, that is the most optimistic scenario. We find that the 
local body was able to meet its revenue expenditures in all the years with this level of own 
revenue.  
In case of DNCC and DSCC, we followed a different approach. We did not consider revenue 
expenditure as one of the variables to suggest the raise required in the own revenue because own 
revenue receipts already exceeded the revenue expenditure in both the ULBs. We considered the 
lowest own revenue to GCP ratio as found for KMC as a guide to decide the most optimistic 
scenario. The lowest own revenue to GCP found in KMC was in the year 2010-11 at 1.3 percent. 
We suggest own revenue to GCP to be at least 1 percent in both DNCC and DSCC (which is 
lower than the lowest ratio found for KMC). Thus, in order to improve the fiscal performance of 




percent for both DNCC and DSCC. We now analyze the status of service delivery in KMC, 
DNCC and DSCC. 
6. Service Delivery Indicators 
For the Dhaka city corporations, we considered the 2011 census data, when the DNCC and 
DSCC were unified under the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC). Data on service delivery was 
collected from the DNCC and DSCC and these are compared it with the physical norms. In the 
absence of physical norms for service delivery for Bangladesh, we consider the 
recommendations by the High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) (GOI, 2011) as benchmarks. 
In terms of having tap as a source of drinking water and electricity as a source of lighting, both 
KMC and the Dhaka City Corporation are close to each other (Table 8). Both the cities are 
performing well in these two aspects particularly with respect to access to electricity with 96 
percent and above households having the facility. DNCC has 100 percent closed sewerage while 
for DSCC the share is only 52 percent. In Kolkata city, about 43 percent of the households have 
piped sewers. With respect to solid waste management, collection efficiency is much below the 
recommended norm. Both DNCC and DSCC are able to collect less than 75 percent of the solid 
waste generated in the city. The remaining lies in the open unattended (Ahmed, 2014). Both the 
road density as well as area under roads also falls much below the norm. Overall, KMC is doing 
better than both DNCC and DSCC and within Dhaka; one can say that the higher expenditure in 
the DSCC is not reflected in better service delivery as compared to DNCC. DSCC falls behind 





Table 8. Service Delivery for KMC, DNCC and DSCC* vis-à-vis Service Delivery Norms 
Services  Kolkata  Dhaka Norms 
Households having 





Households having tap as a 
source of drinking water  88% 85.4%  
NA 
Sewerage and Drainage 
43% households with piped 
sewers 
81% households having access 







Solid Waste Generated** 
(tons/day) 
 4500 MT/ day 4220 (DNCC) 
3300 (DSCC) 
 
Solid Waste collection (%) NA 74% (DNCC) (2018-19) 
(household waste, 
partial construction 
waste, street waste and 
business waste) 




Road Density (km per 




Road (% age of area under 
roads)***  5% (DSCC) 
11% 
Sources: 1) Field Survey for DNCC and DSCC, 2) Census of India, 2011 and Status Report Solid Waste Management 
(Feb 2019) for KMC; 3) HPEC (2011); 4) DNCC (2019); 5) Wasim and Nine (2017) 
*Data was available for the year 2017-18 (except for road (%age), which was available for the year 2012-13) 
** The source for DNCC for solid waste generated and collected was DNCC (2019) and for DSCC was Wasim and 
Nine (2017) 
***data was not available for DNCC 
 
Comparison of Finances with Benchmarks 
After comparing the service delivery, we now compare the expenditure incurred by the ULBs to 
the city size-wise financial benchmarks set by the High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) 
(GOI, 2011) for Indian cities. This analysis is done only for KMC, as we could not get the data 
on service level expenditure incurred by DNCC and DSCC. We compared the existing per capita 
expenditures with the per capita operation and maintenance financial norms given by the High 
Powered Expert Committee (GOI, 2011). For all the five basic services together (that is water 
supply, sewerage and drainage, streetlights, roads and solid waste management), the average 




of adequate level of service delivery. In addition, when we look at the trend over time, we see 
that the gap between actual revenue expenditure and expenditure norms increases over time. 
While the norms remain the same for each year, we can say that there has been a consistent fall 
in the revenue expenditure by the KMC over time. Table 9 provides the gap between revenue 
expenditure on services and expenditure norms over years 
Table 9. Fiscal Health in KMC over Years (per capita US$) 
Indicator 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 
Gap between revenue 
expenditure and 
expenditure norms 
4.1 -6 -2.9 -6.2 -3.9 -6.3 -7.2 -8.3 
Source: Authors’ computation  
 
7. Summary of Findings and Implications for Policy 
The paper has presented an overview of the finances of the corporation in the Indian city of 
Kolkata (KMC) and the city corporations in Bangladesh’s capital city, Dhaka (DNCC and 
DSCC). Based on the incomes and expenditures of these three corporations, we delve into the 
implications for service delivery in both Kolkata and Dhaka. KMC is about 2/3rd of the size of 
DNCC and DSCC combined and has a much lower population density. Data reveals that the 
revenue receipts of KMC is significantly higher than that of either DNCC or DSCC or even both 
the bodies combined. This is true for own revenue as well as for grants from the upper tiers. 
What emerges as a stark difference in our finding is that both DNCC and DSCC have expenses, 
which are way below the low level of existing earnings. These expenses are less when compared 
with international expenditure norms. Thus, revenues are higher than expenditures in the case of 
the city corporations in Dhaka while for the KMC the revenue is not sufficient to cover the 
expenditures. It is to be noted that the expenses stated in this analysis do not include capital 




DSCC would not indicate a ‘surplus’, but abysmally low levels of expenditures on provision of 
urban services, which is also reflected in the status of service delivery in these cities.  
Property tax accounts for lion’s share of the tax revenue in both Kolkata and Dhaka. Total tax 
revenues constitute the greater part of own revenue for KMC while for Dhaka non-tax revenues 
obtained from fees, fines, rates, etc. has a higher share in own revenue. Interestingly, despite the 
low revenue generation capacity of the DNCC and DSCC, this is what comprises the bulk of 
total revenue. Grants received from the upper tiers is very low in DNCC and DSCC compared to 
the fact that close to half of KMC’s total revenue comes from grants.  
Service delivery is a primary manifestation of the level of expenditure. In both DNCC and 
DSCC, the low spending is reflected in the poor delivery of essential services. When compared 
with the recommended physical norms, the status quo in Dhaka is much below the norms. 
Kolkata also falls short of the norms but the gap between the norms and the status quo is smaller 
compared to that of Dhaka.  
We juxtaposed the expenditure norms with the actual revenue expenditure in the case of KMC. 
This could not be done for Dhaka due to non-availability of service-wise revenue expenditure. 
We also estimated the GCP for Dhaka and did some simulation exercises for raising the revenue 
capacity. Based on these exercises, we suggest raising the own revenue to GCP ratio in KMC to 
4 percent and to at least 1 percent in both DNCC and DSCC. 
For KMC, we propose an increase in own revenue by tapping its property tax and non-tax 
revenue handles. With respect to the property tax, we need to introduce a GIS mapping of 
properties. In case of non-tax revenue, we suggest 1) enhancing the rates/charges of the existing 




component, the services like roads, sewerage and drainage should be improved, which can 
further help KMC raise revenues from these handles. KMC has plans to improve the Solid Waste 
Management, which can help it raise revenue from this handle by increasing the existing charges. 
Another potential handle is car-parking fees. Given the increasing numbers of private cars, KMC 
should raise the car parking fees, which is still on hold. The cable operators pay a share of their 
fees to Multiple System Operators, as prescribed by TRAI, but it is found unjustified by the 
operators. Some portion of this could be diverted to KMC as cable operator charges. The 
unrecorded (illegal) installation of mobile towers over building rooftops need to be tracked and 
charges should be levied on them. 
As far as revenue expenditure is concerned, we saw that only is the KMC not spending as desired 
by the expenditure norms to fund basic services but there is also a consistent fall in revenue 
expenditures. We recommend proper audit to monitor the expenditures of the ULB. For Dhaka, 
even though the expenditure is significantly below the revenue income, this can hardly be 
considered as good fiscal health, given the poor deliverance of services to the city dwellers. 
Understandably, the large migrant population, who do live in the city but lack a sense of 
ownership given their bearings outside Dhaka, does not generate sufficient demand for quality 
services. There are a couple of reasons for that. Firstly, a large majority of the people in Dhaka 
city live on rented accommodation, and as such, their willingness to contribute in terms of 
charges or taxes would be less as compared to the owners of those dwellings. Secondly, factors 
such as low literacy rate and low-income levels (which are a characteristic of the city) are a key 
deterrent to the demand for augmented services. Against this backdrop, improvement in the 
services and amenities of the city must be supply-driven, based on the premise that enhanced 




Utilizing all the revenue handles to a fuller extent is key to augmenting revenues. The property 
tax rates in Dhaka have not been revised for more than three decades. Just this one reform 
alongside a good collection efficiency can significantly raise the corporations’ own revenues. 
Several unexplored areas can be reined in for raising non-tax revenues. First, cable operator and 
mobile tower charges should be tapped. Second, given the congestion in the city some 
conservancy charges should be introduced. Third, the car-parking problem should be tackled in 
structured manner. The car-parking fee should be introduced such that the fee structure is 
contingent on the vehicle type and the space it is occupying. Moreover, differential charges for 
peak time and off time, commercial and residential areas should be introduced. In addition to 
this, one-time parking fee could be introduced as per the price of the car. 
Bangladesh is slated to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Country status in 2024. A key 
development challenge would be to make Dhaka, a city that houses more than 35 percent of the 
country’s urban population, more sustainable. Towards that end, we recommend that an urban 
renewal mission be introduced for the cities of Dhaka. The reform should clearly delineate the 
role of upper tiers of the government in supporting the urbanization in the city. In addition, there 
should be physical norms designed, which should state the level of service delivery desired 
according to the size class of the city corporations. Corresponding to the level of service delivery 
there should also be the financial norms instituted. Such an exercise would help assess the 
expenditure needs of the cities. Last but not the least, we recommend a proper audit of the 
accounts of the local bodies. These measures would help accelerate the pace to making Dhaka a 
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1. Roads and bridges 
2. Water supply for domestic industrialization and commercial purpose 
3. Burials and burial ground, cremation ground and electric crematorium 
4. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stop and public 
conveniences 
5. Safeguarding interest of weaker section of society, including the handicapped 
and mentally retarded 
6. Slum improvement and upgradation 
7. Urban poverty alleviation 
8. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens and 
playground 
9. Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects 
10. Cattle pounds and prevention of cruelty to animals 
11. Urban planning, including town planning 
12. Regulation of land use and construction of building 
13. Planning for economic and social development 
14. Fire services 
15. Urban forestry, protection of environment and promotion of ecological aspects 
16. Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths 
17. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries 
18. Public health, sanitation conservancy 




Box A2. List of finances devolved to Urban Local Bodies in India 
Tax Revenue  
1 Property tax 
2 Profession tax 
3 Sanitation/Conservancy tax (if ‘charge’, then it’s a non tax) 
4 Scavenging tax 
5 Latrine tax 
6 Drainage tax 
7 Education tax 
8 Entry/Terminal tax 
9 Taxes on vehicles 
10 Advertisement tax 
11 Entertainment tax 
12 Pilgrim tax 
13 Environment tax/land revenue 
14 Betterment/Development tax 
15 Passengers & goods tax 
16 Timber tax 
17 Tax/toll on animals 
18 Cable operator tax 
19 Toll/Tax on bridges/vehicles 
 Non-Tax Revenue 
20 Sanitation/Conservancy charge 
21 Water charges 
22 Surcharge on sales tax 
23 Birth/Death registration fees 
24 Betterment fees 
25 Mutation fees 
26 Dangerous and offensive trade license fees 
27 Slaughter house fees 
28 Market fee 
29 Fee for fire services  
30 Fees on dogs 
31 Fees for registration of animals etc. 
32 Parking fees 
33 Fee on building application 
34         Duty on transfer of immovable property 
35          Penalty for late tax payment 
36        Stamp Duty 
37        Rent from municipal properties 
38        Receipts from fines 
39        Receipts from interest 







Box A3. Valuation Method of Property Tax in Kolkata Municipal Corporation 
The property tax is evaluated on the basis of annual rental value. The annual value is 
determined by multiplying the monthly rent by 12. Where property is owned by someone, the 
monthly rent is determined by comparing the property with similar rented properties in the 
locality. A 10 percent statutory allowance is deducted to arrive at annual value. In case of 
theatre/cinema halls, 7.5 percent of gross annual receipts less taxes is considered as annual 
value of the hall. The tax rates are applicable as following: 
S No Annual Valuation (in rupees) Annual Tax Rebate if tax deposited on 
time 
1 AV less than 600 0.11*AV 0.05* Quarterly Tax 
2 AV greater than 600 but less than 18000 (AV/600+10)*1/100*AV 0.05* Quarterly Tax 
3 AV greater than 18000 0.4*AV 0.05* Quarterly Tax 
Quarterly Tax = Annual Tax/4 






Table A1. Year-Wise Per Capita Revenue Receipts and Per Capita Revenue Expenditure in 
KMC, DNCC, DSCC from 2012-13 to 2017-18 (US$) 
2012-13 
Category KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  31.8 4.3 4.9 
Tax Revenue  32.5 4.5 5.0 
Non Tax Revenue  17.3 4.9 4.8 
Own Revenue  49.8 9.4 9.8 
Grants  33.6 0.4 0.7 
Total Revenue Receipts  89.6 11.0 11.9 
Total Revenue Expenditure  87.9 3.4 5.9 
2013-14 
  KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  20.2 4.5 4.7 
Tax Revenue  20.9 4.7 4.8 
Non Tax Revenue  18.0 4.4 4.6 
Own Revenue  38.9 9.2 9.4 
Grants  31.3 0.3 2.8 
Total Revenue Receipts  70.3 10.6 12.6 
Total Revenue Expenditure  74.9 3.7 5.8 
2014-15 
  KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  19.8 4.4 4.1 
Tax Revenue  20.4 4.6 4.3 
Non Tax Revenue  13.1 4.7 5.1 
Own Revenue  33.6 9.3 9.4 
Grants  30.1 1.3 3.1 
Total Revenue Receipts  63.7 10.7 12.5 
Total Revenue Expenditure  74.5 3.6 5.9 
2015-16 
  KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  20.5 4.1 4.0 
Tax Revenue  21.6 4.2 4.1 
Non Tax Revenue  11.5 4.8 4.4 
Own Revenue  33.1 9.1 8.5 
Grants  39.8 2.2 5.9 
Total Revenue Receipts  72.9 11.4 14.6 
Total Revenue Expenditure  76.2 3.7 6.5 
2016-17 
  KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  20.1 3.9 3.5 
Tax Revenue  20.8 4.0 3.6 
Non Tax Revenue  11.1 4.1 5.7 
Own Revenue  31.9 8.0 9.3 
Grants  33.4 0.5 0.7 
Total Revenue Receipts  65.3 8.7 10.1 
Total Revenue Expenditure  65.7 4.1 5.3 
2017-18 
  KMC DNCC DSCC 
Property Tax  14.5 3.3 2.8 
Tax Revenue  15.3 3.4 2.9 
Non Tax Revenue  8.1 3.8 3.9 
Own Revenue  23.5 7.2 6.8 
Grants  28.2 0.6 0.9 
Total Revenue Receipts  51.7 8.2 7.6 
Total Revenue Expenditure  64.0 3.7 5.8 




Map 1. Dhaka Urban Cluster in Bangladesh 
 
Map 2. Districts in the State of West Bengal in India 
 
 
